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6Abstract
This paper focuses on perceptions of the European Union (EU) and 
external actors (such as the United States, Russia, and Turkey) in six 
countries of the Western Balkans (WB) and Croatia in a comparative 
perspective. We present data generated by public opinion polls and 
surveys in all countries of that region in order to illustrate growing 
trends of EU indifferentism in all predominately Slavic countries 
of the region. In addition, there is an open rejection of pro-EU 
policies by significant segments of public opinion in Serbia and in 
the Republic of Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, there 
is much enthusiasm and support for the West in general and the EU 
in particular in predominately non-Slavic countries, Kosovo and 
Albania. We argue that the WB as a region defined by alleged desire of 
all countries to join the EU is more of an elite concept than that shared 
by the general population, which remains divided over the issue of 
EU membership. In explaining reasons for such a gap we emphasise 
a role of interpretation of the recent past, especially when it comes to 
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Introduction
The idea of the Western Balkans as a separate region has its 
roots in the second half of the 1990s, in the immediate aftermath 
of a rather serious failure of a European policy towards countries 
of the former Yugoslavia. Its appearance signified ambition for a 
grand return of Europe to the Balkans. Although Europe (then 15 
member states) was initially relatively successful in its diplomatic 
efforts to reach compromise between Slovenia and the Yugoslav 
Federation (in July 1991), its later failure to prevent and stop the 
wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina opened doors of the 
Balkans wide to the United States (US), and – indirectly – to other 
external actors, including the Russian Federation. The US became 
present in the region, and redefined its role in wider Europe, 
largely due to its intervention in post-Yugoslav wars. These wars, 
which revealed that post-Communist transition to democracy 
has its serious risks and cannot per se and by default guarantee 
peace and stability, offered a strong argument in favour of 
preserving rather than dissolving NATO. They showed that the 
hour of Europe has not yet come1 – especially not of Europe that 
is tempted to construct its new political identity in opposition 
and as an alternative to all external powers, including the US. 
American involvement, in as much as being helpful for the 
purpose of securing peace and stability, challenged a new 
European narrative which was based on a vision of a united, 
peaceful and largely self-sufficient Europe (Europe sui generis), 
with its own identity and highly emancipated from influences 
of external actors.2 The area of the former Yugoslavia, in addition 
to being a battlefield for local nationalisms, became a political 
battlefield for influence, primarily between Germany and the 
US, but also with a strong involvement of other actors, including 
some EU member states, which used it to achieve their own 
1 Here we refer to famous words by Jacques Poos, the Chair of the EU Foreign Affairs 
Council, who on 29 June 1991, said: „This is the hour of Europe—not the hour of the 
Americans…. If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. 
This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.” 
See: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/29/world/conflict-in-yugoslavia-europeans-
send-high-level-team.html. [accessed 21 February 2018].
2 Although we here use the concept of „external actors“ for the US, Russia and Turkey, we 
are aware that all three states are only relatively external to Europe. Due to historical, 
geographical and political reasons, they have been attached to Europe and are in 
many substantial ways only semi-external to it. This can be seen in concepts such 
as „Euroasian“ and „Euro-Atlantic“ space. There is, therefore, a good reason to doubt 
whether Europe can ever become fully emancipated from these three external powers 
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national interests (the United Kingdom and France).3 When 
Europe decided to try again, with the first formal steps taken to 
Europeanize the Western Balkans immediately after the end of the 
post-Yugoslav wars, the resistance to this process by key leaders 
in the region (primarily Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, and to a 
lesser extent Franjo Tuđman in Croatia), led to further American 
involvement in two rather different ways. While the US treated 
Croatia as an ally and provided full support for its key national 
aims4 – such as reintegration of a secessionist territory of Serb 
Krajina into Croatia in 1995 – towards Serbia the US showed 
hostility that culminated in the war in Kosovo in spring 1999. 
In both cases, the US involvement shaped the future of the 
countries concerned. In Croatia – as well as in Kosovo, Albania 
and among Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina - the US became an 
efficient alternative to the inefficient and/or hesitating EU. In 
Serbia and for Bosnian and Montenegrin Serbs (as well as for Serb 
refugees from Krajina), American interventions in 1995-1999, 
which were hesitantly supported by all EU member states, served 
as the basis for anti-Western political mobilisation. Thus, the war 
and the official memories of the war provided grounds for non-
European (or at least: semi-European) alternatives to the role the 
EU wanted to play in the WB. Although the EU still claims that 
there is “no alternative to the EU” in the Balkans, this is not how 
local population sees reality. They see it in more complex terms. 
Those who benefitted from the US involvement when Europe was 
inefficient see Washington – not Brussels - as a saviour and thus 
a key ally. Those who feel that the US intervention was hostile to 
them are thinking of other alternatives, addressing their hopes 
and expectation primarily – but not exclusively - to Russia.
Creating the Western Balkans
When creating the notion of the Western Balkans, the EU had 
in mind alleged similarities among all countries concerned. 
However, it neglected differences, some of which led to the 
3 In one such episode of a competition for prestige and importance, France insisted 
that the Dayton Peace Accord should be signed in Paris. Major powers of that time 
demonstrated their status by being represented at the highest level at the ceremony of 
signing the Accord on 14 December 1995.
4 In the second half of the 1990s, Croatia opposed European plans for the Western 
Balkans and feared that the EU would introduce sanctions in response to increasingly 
authoritarian style of governing introduced by Franjo Tuđman. It moved closer to the 
US to prevent this. Successfully. When in 2008 Slovenia blocked Croatian EU accession 
over an open issue of maritime border in the Bay of Piran, the US mediated in order to 








XXIV (83) 2018, 
6-32
conflicts of the 1990s, whereas others emerged as a consequence 
of these conflicts. These differences prevent the region to 
be constructed as a unit. The EU would contribute to this by 
insisting on an individual (country-by-country) approach, which 
made the concept of the Western Balkans (or later, after Croatia 
joined the EU in 2013 – the Western Balkans Six, the Restern 
Balkans) defunct in real political terms. Instead of encouraging 
all countries of the region to first resolve their mutual disputes, 
the individual approach to EU membership directed them to 
further competition, and to “vertical” communication with 
Brussels, rather than “horizontal” with each other.  
Still, it is indeed true that there are many similarities between 
countries concerned. All of them have been in transition from 
their own violent recent past towards (for now only promised, 
not materialised) membership of the EU. The membership in 
the EU is presented as an end-post of this process, the end of 
a complex transition, which involved not one or two, but five 
elements. Transition in countries of the former Yugoslavia (and 
to some degree in Albania too) involved radical changes of (1) 
political and (2) economic system, of (3) the politics of identity, 
of (4) statehood, in addition to being also (5) a transition from 
war to peace. Neither the EU nor local political leadership in 
the WB were prepared for such a multileveled process for which 
there are no ready-made recipes in any of previous waves of 
democratic transition (Jović 2010).
The process of Europeanisation that was shaped specifically 
for this region was thus significantly different and more 
complex than transitions in East and Central European post-
Communist states. It resembled more original incentives for 
starting a process of the European integration in the 1950s and 
the 1960s. The idea of the European Union being also an anti-
war project resonated well in the Western Balkans, although, 
in the meantime, contested by some key EU actors, such as 
the United Kingdom for which the EU was primarily – if not 
exclusively – about economics, not much about politics or peace 
and war.5 The expectation was also that by joining the EU these 
5 In British official discourse, the European Union was about economic cooperation, much 
more than about anything else, including political integration. However, this discourse 
has neglected the anti-war dimension of the process in countries that have experienced 
war in recent past. The UK viewed NATO as an institution that should provide security 
in post-war regions, including in the Western Balkans. This view was close to the US 
discourse on the Western Balkans. The US argued that political and economic integration 
of the Western Balkans in the EU is compatible with its security-based integration in 
NATO, which provided grounds for a division of tasks between the EU and NATO. The UK 
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states would reduce chances for a further conflict, both with 
each other and within. This was not only driven by the idea of a 
democratic peace theory, which sees democracy as a key for peace-
building, but also because no member state of the EU has so far 
disintegrated either through a secession or through a civil war. 
Thus, the EU is still seen as the best framework for stabilisation 
of fragile and weak states.6 It is, after all, the community that 
claims to be based on shared values such as democracy, rule of 
law and minority rights. Countries that are prepared to accept 
and enhance these values have been promised a European 
perspective. Europe is not only a territory, or an area, but also 
– and primarily – a community of shared values, among which 
peace-building has an important place. 
The Western Balkans was created as a temporary region, not 
only because it was seen as a waiting room for EU membership, 
but also because its main raison d’être would disappear once 
the last of its candidate-countries joins the EU. Balkans would 
then, in political terms, become just Southeast Europe (Lampe, 
2006). But before this happens (if ever), the key element of its 
political identity and (weak) cohesion was to be found in its 
Europeanisation, i.e. in transition towards the EU (and NATO). 
This transition was externally guided by the EU itself. The 
EU guiding role is seen through a conditionality policy that 
identified standards to be reached and criteria to be met for 
EU membership. The EU is thus involved not only in terms of 
conceptualising and defining the region, but also as an agent 
and a dynamo of its permanent reforming. It became the 
external magnet that influenced internal processes – primarily, 
but not exclusively, as a soft power. It carried a stick, not only 
a carrot. It became an interventionist power, a friendly but 
strict tutor. Evidence for this can be found not only in 1999 
intervention in Kosovo, which EU countries joined and some 
of them even initiated (the UK under Tony Blair), but also in 
insisting that the full compliance with ICTY (The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) should be one of 
key conditions for EU membership. 
6 Referendum in Scotland in 2014 was a test for this: had secessionists won it would 
have been much more difficult to argue that joining the EU brings more stability to a 
country. However, since neither Scottish nor later Catalan referenda succeeded, the EU 
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Political elites and public opinion on the EU: enthusiasm, 
scepticism, indifferentism 
Although reluctantly, since 2000 political elites of all Western 
Balkan countries have been verbally supportive of EU accession 
processes, whether out of the genuine or faked enthusiasm for 
the project of Europeanisation itself, or for pragmatic reasons – 
i.e. because a price for any alternative policy would be too high.7 
It would be too dangerous to resist: this would lead to isolation or 
worse. Those sceptical and unconvinced tried to reconcile their 
own particularistic vision of national interests with the idea of 
joining the EU. For example, even staunch sovereigntists began 
to argue that it is only through becoming a member of the EU 
that a state can turn its largely nominal and symbolic national 
sovereignty into something meaningful (Jović 2011b). Declaring 
independence is not enough in itself if a country is exposed 
to international sanctions, UN peace-keeping missions, the 
international tribunal’s permanent intrusions into its judicial 
sovereignty or if its constitution is written by foreign powers 
which prevent key decisions regarding the future of a country 
(such as a referendum on independence or on unification with 
neighbouring countries). Not to mention when external powers 
were directly involved in making of states, such as was the case 
in Kosovo, whose secession from Serbia would be impossible 
without the active support of the US. These – for many in the 
countries concerned - undesirable and unpopular intrusions 
into national sovereignty could be stopped only with becoming 
a member of a respected international club, which treats you as 
one of their own, not as an object of their policies. Becoming an 
EU member, for most political elites in the region, is a matter of 
turning away from being an object of international politics and 
becoming instead a subject – from “being on the table” (e.g. on 
agenda) into “having a seat at the table”. It was about replacing 
nominal sovereignty with “real sovereignty”, whatever this 
concept means in a post-Westphalian global order that was 
7  In some cases, agreeing to regional cooperation was not unconditional. Croatia, for 
example, agreed only when convinced that the main objective of regional cooperation 
was not a re-establishment of Yugoslavia. Also, countries of the region argued 
against another caravan approach to enlargement. They insisted – and still do - on 
the individual approach and oppose grouping into one whole. The country that is 
considered a front-runner argues that it does not want to wait for the others, but 
prefers to join the EU on its own merit. However, so far only Croatia managed to reach 
its main objective, in 2013. Individual approach to countries is in contradiction with 
the notion of a region, and it thus undermines the concept of the Western Balkans as a 
region. Such an approach has been one of key motivators for further bilateral disputes, 
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announced, if not constructed in reality, by key visionaries of 
European integration.  
While the elites agreed to pursue EU membership as their 
supreme objective, general population in some of its countries 
– not in all of them - remains sceptical and even dismissive. A 
gap between the elites and the population on European issues 
is, of course, not something that the Western Balkans is unique 
for. A whole European project is being largely built by elites, 
which to these days have significant difficulty to convince 
their own population to follow. Paradoxically, it is this gap 
between elites and population that makes countries of the 
Western Balkans much more similar to member states than not. 
Unlike political elites which are all pro-EU, the public opinion 
is divided and the support for membership has been declining 
almost continuously over the last ten years. If one of the main 
characteristics of identity of the Western Balkans is in alleged 
desire by its countries to join the EU, then such desire can be 
established for elites, not for population, at least not equally for 
public opinions of all countries. In this sense, there is perhaps 
the elite’s Western Balkans but not the people’s Western Balkans. 
 Croatian EU-indifferentism
This gap between the views of the elites and of the population 
was already evident in the case of Croatia. At its referendum on 
membership in the European Union (in January 2012), only 28.8 
percent of total electorate voted in favour, 14.4 percent against, 
with the largest number of Croatians (56.5 percent) abstaining 
from voting (Jović, 2012). Faced with such EU-indifferentism – 
defined here as a predominant confusion about whether EU 
membership is good or bad for one’s own country - Sabor (the 
Croatian Parliament), in expectation of such a low support, 
changed the Constitution by removing the threshold of 50 
percent participation in order for a referendum to be valid. 
Croatian population was in two minds over joining the EU. The 
predominant view was one of EU indifferentism. On the one 
hand, there were many reasons in favour of membership such 
as security concerns, identity issues (“returning to Europe”, 
“away from the Balkans”), as well as the feeling that by ending 
the transition from Yugoslavia to the European Union the 
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over decision-making (Jović 2011). Although recognised as 
an independent state, Croatia was between 1991 and 2013 
“guided” and “supervised” by external powers over which it 
had no influence. Some instruments of this, for many Croatians 
undesirable, intrusion into the country’s just achieved nominal 
sovereignty, included the presence of UN peace-keepers 
(UNPROFOR) on its territory, the intrusion into its judicial 
sovereignty by the ICTY, and a new – more demanding - set of 
criteria for EU membership that were applied for the first time 
to Croatia. Many felt that the Western powers are standing in 
the way of turning nominal into real sovereignty. In addition, 
the more sovereigntist segment of public opinion blamed the 
West for its policies at the beginning of the Yugoslav conflicts. 
They claimed that some Western states (primarily the United 
Kingdom) acted immorally when they failed to assist Croatia, 
which was the victim of Serbian expansionism.8 
In the imaginary of the Croatian public opinion, the West 
was, thus, not a uniquely positive concept although it was 
much more positive than the – now rapidly disappearing 
- East, and especially the Balkans. In the new imaginary 
of European politics, the Balkans became the “new East”, 
it became Orientalised, not only for Croatians but also for 
many other Westerners. On the one hand, the West was an 
alternative to “the Balkans”, which was now increasingly 
identified as “Serbia” (Zambelli 2010). On the other hand, it 
was also perceived as an actor that pressurises Croatia into 
submission. This was considered unfair, and also possibly 
humiliating and insensitive, taken the nature of suffering 
that Croatia experienced during the 1990s. The other side of the 
coin – the authoritarian character of Franjo Tuđman’s decade 
– was not something that Croatia was prepared to critically 
reflect upon. And neither was this the case with its own role 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the wars of the 1990s,9 or with 
its hostilities and policies of ethnic engineering with regards 
to ethnic Serbs, whose numbers had shrunk in the 1990s 
from 12 to 4.5 percent of the total population of Croatia. The 
8 For the role of the UK in the Yugoslav wars from a critical perspective, see Glaurdić 
(2017).
9 This was obvious in first official reactions to verdict by which six ethnic Croat political 
and military leaders of Herzeg-Bosna were convicted by the ICTY on 27 November 
2017. Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković said these verdicts were „deep moral 
injustice towards six Croatians from Bosnia-Herzegovina and towards Croatian 
people“. See: https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/23672-plenkovic-praljak-s-
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Homeland War myth and the official narrative of Croatia being 
the Victim and Victor in the war (Peskin and Boduszynski 2003) 
determined also its orientation towards external actors. When 
it felt that the EU’s pressure was too heavy, Croatia turned to the 
United States and built friendly relations with Turkey, whose 
President Demirel was one of very few foreign dignitaries to 
attend Franjo Tuđman’s funeral in December 1999. The “special 
relationship” with the United States was built as an alternative 
to EU’s hesitations during the war of the 1990s. It resulted in 
the US backing the decisive military operation Storm by which 
the Croatian Armed Forces reintegrated the largest part of 
the secessionist territory of Serb Krajina in August 1995. In 
addition, American diplomatic efforts were a decisive element 
in the process of peaceful reintegration of the remaining 
eastern territories of Slavonia, Baranya and Western Sirmium, 
via Erdut Agreement (implemented in 1998). Close links with 
the US remained available as an alternative to full integration 
into the European Union. Friendship with Turkey, then still 
firmly allied with the US but nowhere near EU membership, as 
well as attempts to build a functional relationship with Israel, 
was seen as part of Croatia’s pro-US orientation. In addition, 
these relationships with external actors were important for 
strategic reasons: friendship with Turkey helped to improve 
relationship with Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina following 
the 1993-4 conflicts between Croats and Bosniaks, whereas 
relationship with Israel helped to remove the long shadow 
of Croatia’s Second World War record, which included also the 
Ustashe-led Independent State of Croatia (NDH). 
It was not before 2000 that the political leadership of Croatia 
moved towards a one-directional foreign policy which treated 
membership in the EU and NATO as its most important strategic 
objective.10 But public scepticism about the EU remained high. 
It was not easy to convince population which celebrated its 
independence from a multi-national federal/confederal state 
of Yugoslavia that it should join another multi-national entity 
that might – in not so distant future – even evolve into a quasi-
federation/confederation. If Croats complained about not being 
treated fairly in Yugoslavia, of which they were about 20 percent 
of population, they have all reasons to be sceptical about their 
influence in the Union in which they would make less than 
one percent. For some, the EU was just another Yugoslavia (as 
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expressed by political formula: EU = YU), and “Brussels” just 
another “Belgrade”.11 The nationalist narratives and myths, 
which are based on the notion that Croats had dreamt of its 
independence for many centuries, remain difficult to reconcile 
with an idea of losing its own local currency (Kuna) that was 
introduced only in 1994, for Euro in the future.  
Even when Croatia joined the European Union, many remained 
unconvinced about benefits of the membership. In a poll 
conducted for Balkan Barometer 201612, only 33 percent of 
Croatians said that the membership in the EU was good for 
their country, while 18 percent thought the opposite. The largest 
number (49 percent) said they did not know whether it was good 
or bad and had no specific view on this issue. 
Western Balkans Six: Albanian EU-enthusiasm and Slavic 
EU-indifferentism
This result for Croatia largely matches the views on the EU 
in other post-Yugoslav countries, with an exception of Kosovo, 
which is in this respect much more similar to Albania than to 
other former Yugoslav states. In fact, most polls on populations’ 
views on the EU conducted in the Western Balkans show 
sharp division between two countries with ethnic Albanian 
majority (Albania and Kosovo), which have high hopes and 
expectations of the membership in the EU, and the rest of 
the Western Balkans – Croatia included – in which the main 
attitude is one of EU-indifferentism and confusion, if not open 
scepticism. By a relatively low level of positive views on Europe, 
Croatia still fits into the Slavic part of the Western Balkans, 
although it no longer takes part in a new Western Balkans Six.13 
In Albania and Kosovo, 81 and 83 percent respectively think 
that EU membership of their countries would be a good thing, 
while only six and two percent respectively think it would be 
bad.14 On the other end of the scale, Serbia was in 2016 the only 
country of the region in which more people (31 percent) thought 
11 For this see Krajina (2013). 
12 See: https://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC_BalkanBarometer_PublicOpinion_2016.pdf. 
[accessed 23 February 2018]. 
13 Since 2013 Croatia acts as „Europe in the Balkans“ – by using influence it now has as an EU 
member state in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the WB-6. It does not consider 
itself a part of the Western Balkans any more, but it wants to preserve influence in the region.
14 See: https://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC_BalkanBarometer_PublicOpinion_2016.pdf. 
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it would be bad for Serbia to join the EU than that it would 
be good (21 percent).15 Close analysis of results for Macedonia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina show that ethnic Albanians and 
ethnic Serbs in these two countries are more positive / more 
negative about the EU than others, and thus the result for 
Macedonia was 47 percent for “good” and 15 percent for “bad”, 
whereas in Bosnia 33 percent for “good” and 21 for “bad”.16 But 
in core post-Yugoslav states – Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia – the number of those indifferent 
(or “in-betweens”) was higher than the number of those who 
were positive about the membership.17
These findings reinforce doubts over the idea that the 
Western Balkans is a region in any political sense which was 
supposed to be characterised by desire to join the EU. It is, 
in fact, divided to its largely indifferent post-Yugoslav area 
(minus Kosovo) and largely pro-EU ethnic Albanian states. 
Among Slavic populations of the former Yugoslavia, the EU 
membership is currently not generating much enthusiasm, 
although there is no open rejection either. Most people show 
no interest in this topic, and certainly do not feel that the 
outcome of the process depend on them. It seems the EU 
membership is the key project for this generation of political 
leaders, but not for current generation of citizens. There is 
a widespread feeling that if the “EU” (in reality: all of its 
current member states, since the decision on accession must 
be unanimous) wished to admit their countries to the Union, 
it would happen regardless of the will of the population in 
the countries concerned. If, on the other hand, others do not 
want further enlargement – or if they object to a particular 
country of the Western Balkans joining the EU - then the 
enlargement will not happen, again irrespective of the 
position taken by population in the Western Balkans. There 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.
17 In this article we use available public opinion surveys by respectable surveyors 
who have conducted longitudinal sociological research in countries of the Western 
Balkans. We have chosen surveys which have been used to inform policy-makers 
both in the countries concerned and in the European Union and thus have 
influenced the process of decision-making. Although we have not produced our 
own survey but relied on those available in public space, we consider this to be a 
legitimate methodological decision for the purpose of this article, since the main 
objective here is to present and explain trends not only when it comes to political 
elites and their views on the EU accession, but also trends in general population in 
the Western Balkans. The alternative to this would be to rely on discourse analysis 
of political speeches and statements by decision-makers, but in doing that we 
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is a belief that the future of the process depends on others, not 
on local actors. Thus, why bother? 
Albanians, both in Kosovo and in Albania, as well as in 
Macedonia (where they are about 25 percent of the total 
population) represent an exception and have very different 
views on the EU than the rest of the Western Balkans. One 
can argue that this is a consequence of a very different recent 
history. In the 1990s, the West stood by Kosovo, and thus 
Albanians see the West as saviour, their protector and the key 
strategic ally. On the other hand, Serbs have had a completely 
different experience with the West. Memories of devastating 
sanctions during the 1990s (for which most Serbs do not blame 
themselves or their political leaders but the West) are still 
very much alive. Even more problematic for many Serbs was a 
decision of most Western states to recognise independence of 
Kosovo in 2008, almost a decade after the end of the war. It is 
from 2009 that popularity of the EU embarked on a downhill 
curve. The war of the 1990s and its aftermath in 2008 recognition 
of Kosovo have created both positive and negative perceptions 
of the West: positive among Albanians, negative among Serbs. 
Memories and interpretations of the recent past cannot simply 
vanish by a magical stick, even if this stick comes with a thick 
carrot – which it does not. 
This is especially the case in societies which are basically 
unwilling to critically assess the role their states and leaders 
played in the 1990s. Blaming “the West” (or anybody else rather 
than themselves) is an essential part of the narrative that resists 
critical reflection on its own nationalist past. This is also an easy 
but dangerous method of creating frustrations and grievances 
that can be easily manipulated for further confrontations 
with former (and possibly also future, e.g. “eternal”) enemies 
in the neighbourhood: Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians, 
especially those from Kosovo. Since many people either directly 
participated in or tacitly supported the expansionist policies 
of Milošević during the 1990s, by allocating responsibility for 
Serbia’s failures exclusively to the West, they create a story in 
which they are just victims of other peoples’ actions, and not 
perpetrators, supporters and stand-byers of crimes committed 
in their name (Dimitrijević 2008). These views also generate the 
sense of being just a passive object in a relationship with the 
West, which is treated as the only Subject of serious decision-
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when it comes to issue of the EU accession. Just like the war 
and peace were “produced” by others, so is the EU accession 
process. In this perspective, little depends on ‘Us’, and much 
on powerful ‘Others.’  
But it is not only those who supported Milošević and 
his regime that have some difficulty in understanding 
Western policy towards the issue of Kosovo. Even Milošević’s 
opponents think it is not only unwise, but unfair that the 
West has changed its approach to Kosovo, from originally 
treating it as de facto independent but de jure part of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in the provisions of the 
1244 UN Security Council Resolution, 1999) to recognising 
independence of Kosovo, risking the unity of the EU and 
NATO in which there was no unanimity with respect to this 
issue. Ten years since Kosovo declared independence, the 
problem has not been solved. On the contrary, it seems that 
the issue of the status of Kosovo is still very much on agenda, 
now affecting directly the process of the EU accession of 
Serbia and Kosovo – and with possible consequences for 
Albania and perhaps also Macedonia. The status of Kosovo, 
which divides the region but also the EU and the UN is, in 
our view, the main obstacle to both EU membership of the 
Western Balkan six into the EU, and to constituting the 
Western Balkans as a region. This is an important problem 
if we define the Western Balkans as an “incubator” for 
membership in the European Union, and as an area in which 
the process of Europeanisation makes the essence of politics. 
The recognition of Kosovo was the main reason for Serbia’s 
explicit rejection of its membership in NATO, and for 
declaring the politics of military neutrality in 2008. Joining 
NATO was in all other cases of post-1989 enlargements 
an obligatory step on the road to joining the EU. Thus, 
the question emerged: can a country join the EU without 
previously joining this politico-security alliance first? Is 
Serbia serious about belonging to the European Union if it 
resists deeper cooperation in security policy? This question 
becomes even more important in the age of increased fears 
for European security, not least because of the migration/
refugee crisis of the 2010s. 
It was also one of the key reasons for the beginning of the 
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ever was such an enthusiasm. The other reasons included the 
internal crisis of the EU, as well as the lack of clear and explicit 
promise that the enlargement would continue. In October 2009, 
as result of the lifting of strict visa regime for tourist visits 
to most of EU member states, according to an IPSOS Strategic 
Market and International Republican Institute poll, 76 percent 
of Serbs supported EU membership for Serbia. But in November 
2015, this number dropped to 49 percent. The opposition to EU 
membership in the same period of six years increased by more 
than twice: from 19 percent in October 2009 to 44 percent in 
2015. In April 2011, the “yes” vote would have clearly won at 
the referendum on EU membership, with 64 percent in favour, 
and only 17 percent against. But four and a half years later, 
in November 2015, the result would be much more uncertain, 
although still positive: 44 percent in favour and 32 percent 
against. 
External actors in the Western Balkans: alternatives and/or 
spoilers?  
Such a change in public opinion is not only a result of 
the pro-Kosovan policy by the West. It is also an outcome of 
frustrations over ever more directly expressed hesitation of 
the EU to continue with enlargement. In 2009 there was still 
some hope that the enlargement would proceed fast (following 
liberalisation of visa regime in November 2009), but this was no 
longer the case by 2015. Two contributing reasons might have 
only facilitated this trend: one is a decision of the new President 
of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, not to have 
a commissioner for enlargement in the EU Commission18; the 
other – change of the course of Serbian politics, which was 
in 2009 led by credible Europeanists, whereas in 2015 this 
was no longer the case. The new leadership in Serbia was still 
committed to EU membership, but it began to use what Dimitar 
Bechev calls “the default pro-Russian position in Southeast 
Europe… that there is no choice to be made between Russia and 
the West”, e.g. that “countries can have it both ways” (Bechev 
2017: 241).
18 In his statement of 15 July 2014, Juncker said: „The EU needs to take a break from 
enlargement so that we can consolidate what has been achieved among the 28… The 
Union and our citizens now need to digest the addition of 13 member-states in the past 
ten years“. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-567_en.htm. [accessed 
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The new, much more pro-active and assertive Russian foreign 
policy has significantly contributed to Putin’s increased 
popularity in Serbia, as well as in Bulgaria, Romania and 
Greece. After the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, Vladimir Putin and 
his Russia established themselves as those who would draw the 
Eastern border of European enlargement. By his intervention 
in Ukraine (over Crimea), Putin emerged as a competitor to 
the West in European peripheries. He challenged the unipolar 
character of European order. Europe is still dominated by 
the European Union, but after 2014 in its peripheries we see 
the emergence of bipolarity or even (with the rising power of 
Turkey, and with new involvement of China through the Silk 
Road project) multipolarity (Jović 2015). Although Russia has no 
capacity to project power equal to the West, it can be a rival and 
a spoiler, especially in the Western Balkans where its popularity 
and influence is larger than elsewhere, with exception of some 
post-Soviet states. 
This trend is further encouraged by victory of Donald Trump 
in the American presidential elections in 2016. His criticism of 
Europe and in particular of the European Union, place Trump 
and his USA as a competitor to the EU’s interests in territories 
and regions outside of the EU. This is one of the reasons why 
anti-EU parties in Serbia (for example, Vojislav Šešelj’s Radical 
Party) and large segments of its alt-Right non-governmental 
organisation scene welcomed such outcome of the presidential 
elections in the US.19 They also welcomed Brexit, which they saw 
as a beginning of the end of the European Union. Although they 
scored badly at national elections in Serbia, the anti-EU forces 
in Serbia have managed to promote the narrative that there “is 
a viable alternative” to the West in the Balkans. This narrative 
is based on praising the Russia’s role in safeguarding Serbia’s 
interests in Kosovo and over Kosovo. If and when Russia prevails 
over the West – as they think might happen sooner or later – 
Kosovo’s recognition will be revoked. In a recent statement 
on Kosovo, the Serb Orthodox Church argued in favour of 
turning the Kosovan case into a frozen conflict, in expectation 
of major changes in global politics in the decades to come.20 
Strong Russia is the key to strong Serbia. Serbia should play the 
game as required by the powerful West for as long as the West is 
19 See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-balkans-biden-trump/vote-for-trump-serbian-
ultra-nationalists-chant-as-biden-visits-idUSKCN10R1U0. [accessed 1 March 2018].
20 See: https://beta.rs/dijalog/dijalog-politika/86821-kosovski-problem-kao-zamrznuti-
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powerful. It should talk a talk, not walk a walk. It should aim at 
protecting its interests by cooperating with the West when and 
if necessary, but never to put all the eggs into one basket. The 
West has taken Kosovo away from Serbia, whereas Russia and 
China have not – and this should be acknowledged in Serbian 
foreign policy. Thus, the policy of one-directionality is against 
Serbia’s best interests.21 
This line of thinking, which is rather popular in the media, in 
intellectual circles and with general population, managed to 
influence politics even before Aleksandar Vučić became the 
main decision-maker in Serbia. Under President Boris Tadić 
Serbian foreign policy was constructed on the notion of „four 
pillars“, these four being the EU, the US, Russia and China.22 There 
is also in recent years some evocation of the former Yugoslavia’s 
President Josip Broz Tito’s policy of non-alignment, both in the 
sense of looking  both towards the East and West, and in the 
sense of relying on friendship with influential non-European 
states, largely members of the non-aligned movement.23 Many 
of them rejected US pressure over recognition of Kosovo, and 
are – jointly with Russia and China - keeping Kosovo outside of 
the United Nations, which Serbia sees as its strategic objective. 
In recent years, Serbia improved its relationships with Arab 
states, China, Russia and Turkey. It also moved closer to most 
EU-sceptic governments within the EU, such as, for example, 
with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. 
This does not mean that Serbian political elite is no longer 
committed to EU membership, but only that it is now prepared to 
consider alternatives in the case that the membership – for this 
or that reason – does not happen, or at least not in this political 
generation. One should not forget that the WB-6 countries are 
waiting for the membership for almost three decades, and that 
some of them are not yet anywhere near it. This is a frustrating 
and humiliating experience, and emotions do have its place in 
21 In this context, sovereigntists in Serbia advocate policy of a „frozen conflict“ in Kosovo. 
See: https://www.vesti.rs/Kosovo/Zamrznuti-konflikt-najbolje-resenje-za-Kosovo-i-
Metohiju.html., https://ba.voanews.com/a/a-29-2007-09-17-voa2-85868017/667424.html, 
etc. [accessed 3 March 2018]. 
22 See: https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2009&mm=08&dd=30&nav_
id=61454. [accessed 22 February 2018]. 













XXIV (83) 2018, 
6-32
foreign-policy making. In the meantime, the EU itself is in the 
crisis and less attractive than it was in the 1990s or the 2000s. 
The new competition between the West and Russia is “a rivalry 
between an opportunist which has a clear set of goals though 
lacks the means to achieve them, and a terminally disoriented 
West that possesses the power assets but is not of one mind 
about how to respond to the challenge” (Bechev, 2017: 249). Is 
it thus completely unreasonable that enthusiasm for this 
objective – which had been in 1990 presented as the “only game 
in town”, and under the slogan “there is no alternative but EU 
membership” – is no longer strong? 
If one analyses further the results of recent public opinion 
polls in Serbia, one can conclude that Kosovo represents the key 
red line in public perception of Serbia’s relationship with the 
European Union. Furthermore, it is used by conservative, pro-
Russian forces to pressurise government into a more cautious 
policy on Europeanisation. Kosovo represents the key element 
of Serbian national myths, but also the point of humiliation 
and defeat by joined forces of Kosovan Albanians and their 
Western allies. In a survey conducted by IRI & IPSOS (2015)24, 71 
percent of respondents for the Serbian sample said that they 
expected Serbia to be forced into recognition of Kosovo in 
order to join the EU (19 percent said that this would not be the 
case). When asked “what should be Serbia’s response to this”, 
57 percent said that Serbia should refuse it, “even if it means 
staying out of the EU”. 
The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy’s survey conducted in 
December 2016 and January 2017, confirms the importance of 
the Kosovo issue. Although 43 percent of respondents said they 
would vote in favour of EU membership (against 35 percent), 
when asked how would they vote if recognition of Kosovo were 
the condition for membership, their responses have changed 
radically: 69 percent against and 13 percent in favour. To place 
such a request as a condition for EU membership most Serbs 
would see as further humiliation and another historical 
defeat. As Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić said on one occasion: 
this would be equal to request the state to commit suicide (he 
used the word Harakiri)25 in order to join the EU. Even the 
most pro-EU politicians would have hard time to convince 
24 See: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/serbia_november_2015_poll_
public_release.pdf. [accessed 2 March 2018]. 
25 See: https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2018&mm=02&dd=26&nav_
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that EU membership is worth committing national suicide, as 
suggested by such discourse, which is now promoted by parts 
of political elite itself.  
Mentally, most Serbs have in fact erased Kosovo from their 
visualisation of contemporary (and possibly also future) 
Serbia. However, to formally recognise Kosovo would for many 
be an act of self-defeat and of compliance with those who had 
helped secessionists to win in what many see as being an illegal 
war of 1999. It would also signify an a posteriori justification 
of NATO bombing. “What is stolen can be claimed back and 
eventually returned. However, what is given by your own will – 
is given forever”, says in their petition against President Vučić’s 
allegedly reconciliatory policy towards Kosovo a group of 174 
public intellectuals, among whom were prominent bishops of 
Serb Orthodox Church, members of Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts and others.26 This Appeal for the Defence of Kosovo and 
Metohija was drafted by Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), which 
has been always rather sceptical towards Serbia’s joining the 
EU. While in government, DSS drafted the Constitution of Serbia, 
which identifies Kosovo and Metohija (Serb name for Kosovo) 
as an integral part of Serbia, e.g. as its autonomous province. 
Now they argue that the “frozen conflict” is the best solution in 
contemporary context and oppose any move that would enable 
Kosovo’s membership in the United Nations. For as long as there 
is hope that things may change in future, Serbia should wait for 
that moment. Kosovo is thus the key issue in which nationalist 
and other anti-EU opposition can unite in their attempt to 
merge the issue of national pride and discontent with alleged 
intentions of Vučić’s government to reach compromise that 
would trade Kosovo’s status for EU membership in the future. 
The fear that the opposition is worse and openly anti-EU is 
also one of the main reasons for current Western support for 
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, despite his increasingly 
authoritarian style of governing domestically. 
Perceptions of Russia 
The policy of non-recognition is linked with the expectation 
and hope that Europe and the world are moving from 
unipolarism and American hegemony to multipolarism, 
26 Full text of the Appeal, as well as the list of signatories, see at: https://www.in4s.net/
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in which Russian role in the Western Balkans will be more 
influential. Pro-Eastern orientation is not limited to some 
marginal groups. Even the Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić, who is 
the leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and occasionally 
plays a role of „an opposition within government“, seems to 
share this view. On the occasion of a February 2018 visit to 
Serbia by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, Dačić 
claimed that Serbia could not see its national interests ever 
being fulfilled without support of Russia.27 
This is also the view of the majority of the electorate, and thus 
it cannot be simply ignored or dismissed, for as long as Serbia 
remains a democracy. The IRI & IPSOS study of the public opinion 
in Serbia (2015)28 asked citizens: “If you have to choose one 
country Serbia’s interests are best served by maintaining strong 
relationship with, which one would that be?”. Not surprisingly, 
Russia came by far the first with 63 percent, whereas the EU 
was second with 12 percent, Germany third with 9 percent, 
followed by China (7 percent), the US (3 percent), and Turkey (1 
percent). Russia came first also when respondents were asked 
whether strong relationship with a particular country was in 
Serbia’s interest. As many as 94 percent said yes to Russia on 
this question, 89 percent to China, 88 percent to Germany, 71 
percent to the EU. On the other end is the United States: only 30 
percent of Serbs think that strong relationship with the US were 
in Serbia’s interests, while 65 percent said this was not the case. 
When asked to explain reasons for their positive view on 
Russia, citizens gave the following reasons: “Russians are our 
Orthodox brothers” (23 percent), “Russia is the only power that 
can confront the West” (20 percent), “it is our biggest export 
market” (18 percent), “it is our protector throughout history” 
(18 percent), “Russia is our true ally in the effort to keep Kosovo 
part of Serbia” (10 percent), “it is our main gas/oil provider” (8 
percent) and “it is the biggest investor in Serbia” (3 percent). It 
matters rather little that some of these statements are clearly 
wrong, as explained by Dimitar Bechev (2017): Russia is certainly 
neither the main trading partner nor the main investor in 
Serbia – this is the European Union. However, voting behaviour 
is based on perceptions, not on facts. Thus they remain relevant, 
even when false. 
27 See Politika, 23 February 2018. 
28 See: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/serbia_november_2015_poll_
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In line with policy of remaining in between, which has 
been promoted by the “four pillars” approach, as well as by 
policy of current government that Serbia wants to remain 
simultaneously a friend of Russia and a candidate for EU 
membership, is the finding of IRI & IPSOS survey in which 61 
percent of Serbs said that “Serbia does not belong to either the 
West or the East”. Interestingly, 19 percent said that it belonged 
to the East, and 12 percent to the West. 
The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy’s survey of 2017 found 
that most Serbian citizens think that influence that Germany, 
China and Russia have on Serbian foreign policy was positive, 
while the influence of the US and the EU was mostly negative.29 
In a more detailed picture, most are prepared to acknowledge 
that EU membership would have positive effects on Serbia’s 
foreign direct investment and for the international standing 
of the country. However, that siding with Russia would enhance 
security and internal stability say 48 and 39 percent of Serbs 
respectively. Membership in NATO remains perceived almost 
entirely negatively: even in terms of enhancing security only 22 
percent of Serbs positively value eventual NATO membership, 
while 43 percent negatively. That current level of cooperation 
with Russia is satisfactory believes 48 percent of respondents 
in that survey. In favour of a stronger and more formalized ties 
“in the shape of a political alliance with Russia” are 23 percent, 
whereas 10 percent think that Serbia’s links with Russia are 
already too tight, and that Serbia has become “a Russian puppet”. 
When asked whether Russian influence on Serbian foreign 
policy is positive or negative, 61 percent said it was either “very 
positive” or “positive”, and 12 percent that it was “negative” 
or “very negative”. In comparison, the influence of the EU 
over Serbian foreign policy is seen as very positive / positive 
by 28 percent, and very negative / negative by 36 percent of 
respondents. It is not surprising therefore to see that 59 percent 
of Serbs would feel indifferent if the EU ceased to exist, and 15 
percent would be happy if this happens (21 percent unhappy). 
The paradox of such a strong pro-Russian, and to a degree 
also anti-EU perceptions in Serbia is that in fact 91 percent of 
Serbs have never been to Russia. Thus, their image of Russia is 
based on imagining, not on personal experience or facts (IEP 
29 See: http://bezbednost.org/upload/document/public_perception_of_serbias_foreign_
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survey of March 2017). Institute for European Policy’s another 
survey (from July 2016) reveals that despite this, 41.3 percent 
of the Serbs identify Russia as Serbia’s main friend, followed 
by Greece (12.1 percent), which many Serbs have visited. On the 
other side of this scale, Croatia is perceived as the main “enemy” 
(19.7 percent), followed by the US (18.1 percent) and Albania (12.1 
percent). One can thus safely conclude that the more the EU 
becomes anti-Russian (in the form of further sanctions against 
Russia), and the bigger role Croatia plays in the process of EU 
accession of Serbia, the more anti-EU is Serbia likely to become. 
The EU should perhaps use the positive image of Greece and 
Germany if it wants to appear more positive towards Serbia, not 
the voice of Brussels or Zagreb. 
Largely negative image of the West, and in particular of NATO 
and the US, is shared by ethnic Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
whose voice cannot be ignored if not for other reasons 
than due to the fact that all foreign policy decisions in the 
Bosnian State Presidency need to be approved unanimously 
by representatives of the country’s three constituent nations, 
including a Serb representative. For that reason, Bosnia-
Herzegovina has not recognised independence of Kosovo. IRI 
Institute’s April 2017 survey reveals a gap between views related 
to Bosnian foreign policy orientation between ethnic Serbs and 
two other nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Bosniaks and Croats. 
In fact, it is not just a gap, but more than that: three nations 
have completely opposite views on issue of the EU and NATO 
membership for their country. While EU membership of Bosnia-
Herzegovina supports 65 percent of Bosniaks and 59 percent 
of Croats (most of whom already have an EU passport, as dual 
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia), only 18 percent of 
Serbs share this view.30 Another research, by the USAID office 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (2016) finds that 72 percent of citizens 
in that country would support EU membership: 89 percent in 
the Federation, but only 41 percent in the Republic of Srpska. 
Although these figures are somewhat more positive for EU 
prospects of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even they reveal that in the 
Serb entity 55 percent opposes and 41 percent supports EU 
membership for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This can be explained by 
hopes among many ethnic Serbs that Bosnia-Herzegovina could 
at some point disintegrate, thus paving the way for either an 
independent state of Srpska, or (preferentially) its unification 
30 See: http://www.iri.org/resource/poll-bosnians-united-opposing-divided-us-eu-and-
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with Serbia. For this to happen, Western power over the region 
would have to be replaced by Russian hegemony – and thus the 
“frozen conflict” scenario is also in this case seen as a preferable 
option. If Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, joins the EU, chances 
for such a scenario would be almost non-existent. No country of 
the EU has so far disintegrated – not even the United Kingdom 
and Spain, in which there were referenda on independence 
by Scotland and Catalonia respectively. Thus, membership of 
a united Bosnia-Herzegovina in the EU is seen as a factor of 
further stabilization of status quo, which is not something that 
ethnic separatists would like to support. 
Even deeper is a divide on potential membership of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in NATO. It is supported by 59 percent of the total 
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while 38 percent is opposing 
it. However, support for NATO membership in the Federation 
is high (85 percent), as high as it is the opposition to it in the 
Republic of Srpska, in which only 15 percent support it (with 81 
percent against).31 
Such a deep division between the two entities of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, caused by staunch rejection of both the EU and 
NATO by Bosnian Serbs, indicates that there is a danger that even 
placing these two issues on the agenda would have a potential 
of risking a fragile balance that has been achieved in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina is thus not divided only on 
internal political issues, but also on issues of foreign-policy. 
This issue is as divisive as it was the issue of independence in 
1992. It corresponds positively to respondents’ view on Russia 
and the United States as two non-EU rival powers. Bosniaks and 
Croats view the US positively (by 64 and 56 percent respectively), 
while Serbs view it negatively (only 26 percent say that the role 
of the US in Bosnia-Herzegovina is positive). On the other hand, 
89 percent of Serbs, but only 29 percent of Bosniaks (and 43 
percent of Croats) see Russian role as positive. 
Conclusion
When it comes to both perceptions of benefits of joining the 
European Union and to perceptions of main external actors, 
31 See USAID Bosnia-Herzegovina report at: http://www.measurebih.com/uimages/final_
MEASURE-BiH_NSCP2016_FindingsReport-BSC_200511201720formatted.pdf. [accessed 
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the Western Balkans remains internally heterogeneous and 
deeply divided. On the one side is Serbia and Serbs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, who are, as Maja Stojanović said in October 2017, 
increasingly Eurosceptic.32 On the other side are Albanians 
in Kosovo and Albania, who support EU integration of their 
countries by 83 and 81 percent respectively. Political elites 
are still pro-EU in all countries of the region, but they must 
take into consideration public perceptions and trends – or 
at least successfully and convincingly pretend that they do. 
In addition to this difference (between Albanians and Serbs) 
there are also deep divisions between Bosniaks and Serbs in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where foreign-policy, especially on key 
issues such as that of the EU and NATO membership, needs 
to be consensual. In Croatia, the prevailing view on the EU 
is one of “EU-indifference”. While not Eurosceptic, Croatia is 
less enthusiastic about the EU, to which it belongs since 2013, 
than Albania and even Macedonia. But EU-indifferentism is 
also growing in other parts of the Western Balkans for two 
reasons: one is to be found in hesitation of the European 
Union to offer a viable and convincing perspective of accession 
in the meaningful future. The second is to be found in the 
gap between elite enthusiasm and popular scepticism which 
produces permanent confusion and then results in a growing 
number of those who „don’t know“ and/or „don’t care“ about EU 
membership.  
The main factor that can explain differences between Serbs 
and Albanians in the Western Balkans is to be found in 
memories (private and official) of the recent past, e.g. of the 
1990s. Most Serbs view the West in general (especially the US 
and NATO) through the prism of their interventions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and especially through the war in Kosovo. 
Albanians do the same, obviously with a very different – in 
fact entirely opposite – perceptions. This is also why there is 
no major rejection of the EU in Macedonia, in which 72 percent 
of the respondents in an IRI Survey (2017) were in favour, and 
21 percent against EU membership of their country.33 In as 
much as Macedonia’s EU and NATO accession has been blocked 
by an EU country (Greece) for more than a decade (since 2008), 
32 See: „Srbija više nije oduševljena Europskom unijom“, Deutsche Welle, 29 October 2017 
(Ivica Petrović). 
33 IRI Survey, Macedonia (4 – 12 March 2017, N = 1.108), Macedonia: National Public 
Opinion Poll. Available at: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2017-5-5_macedonia_
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this country did not share the fate of Serbia during the 1990s, 
and thus there is no major hostility towards any Western 
power. IRI Survey of 2016 shows that the EU comes first (with 
73 percent) when asked for the country or group of countries 
that Macedonia’s interest would be best served by maintaining 
strong relationship with. Germany is second with 70 percent, 
Turkey third with 63 percent, followed by the US (58 percent) and 
Russia (53 percent).34 Macedonian citizens, unlike those in Serbia 
or Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, still support EU membership 
for their country, although not as enthusiastically as in 2008. 
Still, 18 percent think Macedonia will never become a member 
of EU, 25 percent think it will happen more than 10 years from 
now, and 17 percent do not have a view regarding the time 
schedule.35 Recent events in Macedonia, including the initial 
– not yet confirmed – agreement on the name issue between 
the Macedonian and Greek governments has an ambiguous 
potential with regards to general population’s attitude towards 
the EU. Those who oppose the name change (from the Republic 
of Macedonia to the Republic of North Macedonia, as suggested 
by draft agreement) are likely to blame the West for what they 
see as an attack on most fundamental element of Macedonian 
identity. Those who value EU membership that much that 
they would be prepared to compromise over the name issue 
are likely to lead both the referendum campaign in favour 
of changing of the name, as well as further steps towards EU 
membership. However, if the European Union does not respond 
in kind – by offering more than just a promise of joining at a 
certain point in the future  – anti-EU sentiments are likely to 
be further enhanced, primarily among Macedonians. 
The lack of clear perspective, despite many declaratory promises 
about the “European perspective” being opened to all countries 
of the region, is another reason for growing scepticism. EU 
accession for the former communist countries is now almost 
a 30-year old political project. It began with the end of the 
Cold War in 1989, with first concrete steps being taken in East 
Central Europe immediately after. In the Western Balkans, a 
journey towards the EU was delayed due to the Yugoslav wars. 
However, even in these countries the first steps on this journey 
34 IRI Survey 2016 (conducted 19 – 25 April 2016, N = 1.104). See: Survey of Macedonian 
Public Opinion, available at: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_
macedonia_survey_april_2016_0.pdf. [accessed 20 February 2018]. 
35 According to the same survey, 96 percent of Macedonian citizens supported 
membership in EU, while in 2016 – 71 percent. Macedonians also support NATO 
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were taken almost 20 years ago, in 2000. While this project 
successfully mobilised energy and social enthusiasm in Central 
and Eastern Europe before 2004, it is becoming less obvious if 
it is still sufficiently attractive to a new generation of people 
in South East Europe. Many new voters in these countries – 
for example, those born in 1989 - have been waiting for EU 
membership for much of their lives. To them this might look 
like waiting for a Godot. There is a growing sense of unfairness, 
as well as of not having the ownership of the process of EU 
accession among people in this region. 
The EU remains to be engaged economically (76 percent of 
trading is with the EU 28, with Italy and Germany being top 
partners for the Western Balkans), and politically – through the 
Berlin Process, Belgrade-Priština dialogue and through further 
initiatives and statements that support Europeanisation of the 
region. Some of them – such as the Regional Youth Cooperation 
Initiative (RYCO) – are getting popular and are seen as useful 
by younger people. However, the EU is no longer “the only 
game in town”. In fact, it has never been. Even in the 1990s, 
at the peak of self-proclaimed hegemony over whole Europe, 
the EU had to accept involvement of the United States, and the 
then helping hand of Russia and Turkey in the process which 
brought to an end Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian war. 
With Putin becoming the leader of Russia in 2000 (which was, 
among others, one of consequences of the NATO intervention 
in Kosovo), Russia became more assertive in its attempts to 
spoil the game for the West. As Bechev argues, “Russia is not in 
position to roll back Western influence. What it is capable of, 
however, is to project influence, cultivate allies, and profit from 
opportunities as they arise. Or indeed, stir trouble” (Bechev, 
2017: 6). Although it is by far less involved in Balkan economy 
(even in Serbia, 62.5 percent of imported goods and services 
come from the EU and only 9.6 percent from Russia), Russia has 
successfully created an image of the main protector and ally, 
and – most importantly – as an alternative to somewhat too 
intrusive Western policies towards the region. 
Russia “plays a weak hand the best possible way, taking 
advantage of other’s weaknesses”, says Bechev (2017: 17). This 
refers both to internal weaknesses (for example: corruption, 
inter-ethnic conflicts and tension, deficiency in energy 
resources etc.), as well as a lack of will on the side of the West to 
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possible. By hesitating to do so quickly, the EU opens the door 
for external influences, including those of the US, Russia and 
Turkey. Furthermore, it keeps acting as if nothing has changed 
since 2004. Not only that it is not alarmed by increasingly cold 
reception it is met with among general population, but it keeps 
introducing higher and higher criteria and standards for new 
candidates. By doing this, the EU is encouraging candidate 
countries to simulate reforms that they cannot implement due 
to either ever stronger opposition of domestic public opinion, 
or to the character of new demands that are increasingly 
unrealistic. Or – as in most cases – both. 
Thus, if it wants to remain an attractive alternative to 
increasingly illiberal and anti-EU alternatives, the European 
Union should move into the region quickly and with no further 
delay. It should open its doors to all candidate countries now. 
EU membership is unlikely to eliminate EU indifferentism, as 
we saw in the case of Croatia. It will not completely eradicate 
trends towards anti-liberal democracy (or illiberal democracy), 
as we witnessed in Hungary and Poland. However, it can do 
much to address a source of anti-EU attitudes in the countries 
of the Western Balkans by eliminating or reducing the sense 
of unfairness and uncertainty, which is still the main reason 
why many people remain confused and hostile to European 
Union. It will also send a clear signal to all external powers 
that the Western Balkans belongs to Europe, and thus it is not 
open for geostrategic games by increasingly anti-EU oriented 
players. Otherwise, further delays will strengthen the role of 
other actors and might make EU enlargement in the future 
more difficult, if not impossible.  
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